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FROM THE 2014 WORLD CUP
TO THE 2016 OLYMPICS:
BRAZIL'S ROLE IN THE GLOBAL
ANTI-CORRUPTION MOVEMENT
Andrew Spalding, Patrick Barr, Albert Flores, Shaun Freiman,
Kat Gavin, Tyler Klink, Carter Nichols, Ann Reid,
and Rina Van Orden*
I. INTRODUCTION
In the global movement to promote the integrity of government
and sport, Brazil now plays a historic role. It has the rare-though not
unprecedented-fortune of hosting two of the world's biggest and
highest profile sporting events back to back: the FIFA World Cup and
the Olympic Games. These games have, and will, draw the world's
attention to a nation's anti-corruption efforts as few events ever could.
The privilege of hosting these consecutive events has been
granted only two other times in history. First, to the United States,
with the 1994 FIFA World Cup and 1996 Summer Olympics, and then
to Russia, with the 2014 Winter Olympics and 2018 FIFA World Cup.
However, neither the U.S. nor Russia held the promise of making his-
toric anti-corruption strides that Brazil now holds. When the United
States hosted these events two decades ago, the global anti-corruption
movement had not truly taken hold; the world's principal anti-corrup-
tion treaties did not yet exist.' Although the U.S. events may well
have involved their fair share of misconduct, it was not exposed, publi-
cized, and prosecuted in the moment. Indeed, the legal apparatus and
global political will would not fully materialize until several years
* Andrew Spalding is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Richmond
School of Law. The eight co-authors are students in a seminar entitled, "Brazil, Corruption, and
the 2016 Summer Olympics," taught during the 2014-2015 school year.
1. Two treaties have been adopted in an effort to fight corruption since the transpirations
in the United States. See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, Dec. 14, 2005, 2349
U.N.T.S. 41; Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International Busi-
ness Transactions, Nov. 21, 1997, S. TRIqAry Doc. No. 105-43 (1998).
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later, when the 2002 Winter Games in Salt Lake City gave rise to the
birth of the modern Olympic corruption narrative.2
Russia, by contrast, hosted its two mega sporting events in the
midst of a vigorous global anti-corruption movement.' For this reason,
the Sochi Winter Olympics were perhaps the most scrutinized
Olympic event in history for issues of corruption, producing a myriad
of scathing reports and allegations of nearly $50 billion in misused
funds.4 But whatever its successes globally, the anti-corruption move-
ment has not quite taken root in Russia; we do not (yet) observe
broad-based protests or credible domestic reforms.
Brazil, then, is perfectly situated. As this Comment will explain,
Brazil has become a kind of vortex for the global anti-corruption
movement. Its popular protests and governmental response in the
form of specific legal reforms has received much attention. In this
temporary lull between the World Cup and 2016 Olympics, we can
take stock of what Brazil has done well and what it still must do. The
inquiry has implications not just for the Olympics or for sports gener-
ally, but for the reputation of a nation and the credibility of a global
movement.
This Comment is the first in a series of publications on Brazil's
efforts and, we hope, its successes in reducing corruption in the 2016
Olympic Games. It is written as part of a course at the University of
Richmond School of Law entitled "Brazil, Corruption, and the 2016
Summer Olympics"-the co-authors are eight students and their pro-
fessor. While the ultimate product will be a comprehensive analysis of
the role of Brazilian law in controlling corruption, this Comment has a
more modest purpose. It will discuss the various trends and forces that
have converged on Brazil's hosting of the Games, discuss the various
allegations of corruption that are made in relation to the Olympics,
and generate a series of research questions to pursue in the coming
months. Accordingly, Part I describes the rising anti-corruption dia-
logue in Brazil specifically and in sports generally. Part II looks at
corruption allegations surrounding the FIFA World Cup, both broadly
and in Brazil specifically. Part III then introduces the broader history
of corruption surrounding the Olympics and the recent Sochi Winter
2. Bill Mallon, The Olympic Bribery Scandal, 8 J. OL-YMIc HISTORY 11, 11 (2000).
3. Owen Gibson, Sochi 2014: The Costliest Olympics Yet but Where Has All the Money
Gone?, GUARDIAN (Oct. 9,2013,6:24 AM) (U.K.), http://www.theguardian.com/sport/blog/ 2013/
oct/09/sochi-2014-olympics-money-corruption.
4. Robert W. Orttung & Sufian Zhemukhov, The 2014 Sochi Olympic Mega-Project and
Russia's Political Economy, 30 E. EUR. Poi. 175, 181-182 (2014).
[Vol. 21
FROM 2014 WORLD CUP TO 2016 OLYMPICS
Games. The Comment concludes with a series of questions to which
the international community still needs answers.
II. THE BACKGROUND: BRAZIL, CORRUPTION, AND SPORT
The broader context of Brazil's hosting of the mega sporting
events has two dimensions. The first, which Section A discusses below,
is the broader anti-corruption reform movement in Brazil, while the
second dimension, the subject of Section B, is the backstory of corrup-
tion in modern sport.
A. Brazilian Anti-Corruption Developments
With the 2014 World Cup in the history books and the 2016
Olympics on the horizon, the issue of corruption looms over Brazil.
While international attention is now at an all-time high, "legendary
political corruption" is a familiar foe to the Brazilian people.' Leading
up to the two largest international sporting events, the country has
seen massive protests calling for an end to government corruption.
The public outcry for accountability and transparency comes on the
heels of one of the largest corruption scandals the country has ever
seen.6 In the international spotlight, the Brazilian government has be-
grudgingly responded to social unrest, in part, by enacting tougher
laws to combat corruption. However, whether the current anti-corrup-
tion movement will continue to affect change after Brazil passes the
Olympic torch remains to be seen.
Stories of corruption in Brazil are frequent, extravagant, and
reach the highest levels of government. For example, prosecutors last
year uncovered a scheme employed by tax inspectors in S~o Paulo
that allowed businesses to evade over $200 million in taxes in ex-
change for bribes.7 In 2011, it was discovered that state officials in
Parani created numerous nonexistent government employees, funnel-
ing millions from public funds into private bank accounts that the offi-
cials controlled.8 Most notably, in 2005, a high-profile corruption
scandal, dubbed Mensala6 (big monthly), emerged when prosecutors
discovered a vote-buying scheme perpetrated by a group of congress-
5. Simon Romero, Brazilian Corruption Case Raises Hopes for Judicial System, N.Y.
TIMrEs, Oct. 10, 2012, at A4.
6. Id. at A8.
7. Simon Romero, Brazil is Entranced by a Tale of Love, Taxes and Bribery, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 27, 2013, at A6.
8. Josmar Verillo, What's Gone Wrong in Brazil?, TRANSPARENCY INT'L (June 26, 2013),
http://blog.transparency.org/2013/06/26/whats-gone-wrong-in-brazil.
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men, party officials, and the Chief of Staff to former President Luiz
Inacio Lula da Silva.9
But in a country where corruption has been 'business as usual,' it
appears the Brazilian people have had enough. For example, last year
over a million Brazilians took to the streets in a single day to protest
government cuts to social programs and corruption."0 With massive
infrastructure projects undertaken by the government in anticipation
of the 2014 World Cup and more to come before the 2016 Olympics,
the call for accountability and transparency has only intensified. The
government has been slow to respond to public concern, and corrup-
tion is apparently still on the rise. 1
According to Josmar Verillo, Vice-President of Amarribo Brasil
(Brazil's chapter of Transparency International), the problem is that
change only occurs when public outrage makes the issue unavoidable
for the government. 12 While the new administration under President
Dilma Rousseff has vowed to root out corruption, the legislature has
typically been at odds with efforts to do so. For example, the legisla-
ture attempted to pass a law that would make World Cup finances
secret and repeal a law that prevents convicted citizens from partici-
pating in elections or holding office. 3
Despite such internal opposition, there have been promising signs
of change outside the legislature. In the wake of the Mensalad scan-
dal, the Supreme Federal Tribunal of Brazil convicted over twenty
people-including top legislators, senior Working Party officials, busi-
nessmen, and former President da Silva's Chief of Staff-sentencing
them to prison for funneling party funds in order to buy votes from
legislators.' 4 In a country where the legal code offers extraordinary
protections to the elite class, the case was a surprising change for the
people of Brazil who traditionally have not had faith that the justice
system would hold corrupt elites accountable. 5 While the case in-
stilled hope that the courts may begin to act as a legitimate check on
government officials' power, some observers remain skeptical and
9. Corruption in Brazil: Jailed at Last, ECONOMIsr, Nov. 23, 2013, at 39.
10. Verillo, supra note 8.
11. See id. (according to studies cited by Verillo, corruptions cost upwards of $40 billion
each year).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Simon Romero, Key Brazilians in Graft Case Must Go to Jail, Court Says, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 14, 2013, at Al0.
15. Romero, supra note 5, at A4.
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view this case as merely an exception to the general rule that the polit-
ical elite live with impunity.16
Fears that the judiciary would return to its old ways were ignited
when Judge Joaquim Barbosa, then-president of Brazil's Supreme
Court who was at the forefront of the Mensalad scandal, stepped
down from his position.' 7 The concern stems from the fact that an
appointee of President Rousseff-a member of the Working Party
and prot6g6 of former President da Silva-will occupy the vacant
seat.18 To further kindle the public's fear, Vice President Ricardo Le-
wandowski, often at odds with Judge Barbosa during the Mensala6
trial, will occupy the position until President Rousseff makes her ap-
pointment, which has no deadline.' 9
Interestingly, yet another historic corruption scandal is unfolding
in Brazil, involving the country's largest oil company, Petrobras. For-
mer Petrobras executive Paulo Roberto Costa, who was arrested in
March 2014 in a separate money laundering probe, accused more than
forty politicians of participating in a vast kickback scheme designed to
benefit the Brazilian oil giant between 2004 and 2012.20 The partici-
pants allegedly received as much as 3% of the value of contracts
signed between Petrobras and the Brazilian government in exchange
for favorable votes in the legislature. 1 If Mr. Costa's allegations prove
true, the scheme would have occurred under Rousseff while she
served as former President da Silva's energy minister and then as the
president of Petrobras' administrative council.22 Unfortunately for
Rousseff, the timing could not have been worse, as she prepares for
the coming presidential election. Indeed, the perception of impropri-
ety does not bode well for Rousseff, a figure who has taken such a
strong stance against corruption, and her opponents have been quick
to dub the scandal "Mensalad 2. ",23
However, despite the conflict between Rousseff's political alli-
ances and promises to combat corruption, the enactment of Brazil's
new Anti-Corruption Law is a sign the government intends to make
good on its promise. Brazil's new Law took effect earlier this year,
16. Id.
17. Paulo Trevisani & Rogerio Jelmayer, Brazil Judge Who Ran Key Trial Steps Down,
WALL ST. J., May 30, 2014, at A9.
18. See id.
19. Id.
20. The Petrobras Affair: A Charged Campaign, ECONOMIST, Sept. 13, 2014, at 44.
21. Id.
22. See id.
23. Id.
2014]
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right as the government prepared to award more contracts related to
the World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. 24 The law focuses on corpora-
tions, imposing strict liability and harsh penalties for bribing public
officials .2 This compliments Brazil's existing administrative improbity
law that targets corrupt public officials. 26 Before the Anti-Corruption
Law's enactment, corporations faced no liability for engaging in cor-
rupt activities; liability was only imposed on individuals. 27 The law was
well received by the Brazilian business community, but the structure
of Brazil's federal government leaves doubt as to how effective the
law will be.28 The Brazilian constitution allows the country's twenty-
seven states and 5,570 municipalities to interpret federal law how they
wish.29 While the law represents a positive step toward thwarting cor-
porate and government corruption, its success will depend largely on
uniform interpretation and enforcement.
Regardless of whether Brazil's corruption problem is perceived
as the ill effect on Brazilian citizens or the headache it causes for the
government, both parties have set their sights on resolving the issue.
While Rousseff's administration seems committed to combating cor-
ruption, there is no doubt that the public outcry for change and the
international spotlight has spurred governmental action. At face
value, the progress made in both the legislature and judiciary paint a
positive picture for the cause, but it remains to be seen whether the
changes will last once the international spotlight goes out.
B. International Sports Generally
What Brazil is now experiencing-revelations of corruption and
efforts at reform-is likewise occurring across the sporting world.
Corruption in sport has existed since ancient times, with evidence of
match-fixing (arranging for a predetermined outcome of a sporting
event) occurring as early as the ancient Olympic Games.30 But the
24. Brazil's New Anti-Corruption Laws: Hard to Read, ECONOMIST (Jan. 29, 2014 9:40 PM),
http://www.economist.com/blogs/schumpeter/2014/01/brazil-s-new-anti-corruption-law [hereinaf-
ter Hard to Read].
25. Id. (fining firms up to 20% of gross annual revenues, and in particularly egregious cases,
complete dissolution).
26. MARCELO DOS SANTOS BARRADAS CORREIA I3"1" AL, A COMPARISON O1 TIIFE NEw BRA-
ZILIAN ANTI-CORRUI-IION LAW, TInE FCPA, AND TIll1 UK BRIBERY ACr, Assoc. OF CORI'.
COUNSIL (2010), available at http://www.acc.com/legalresources/quickcounsel/cnbalfuba.cfm.
27. Id.
28. See Hard to Read, supra note 24.
29. Id.
30. Suki Casanave, Naked Ambition, UNH MAG. ONINI (Spring 2004), http://unhmaga
zine.unh.edu/sp04/nakedambition.html.
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frequency of modern revelations of corruption in sport, the public out-
rage they produce, and the discussion of reform have perhaps never
been more intense than they are today. Starting from the individual
athletes, to the franchises for which they play, all the way up to the
governing bodies of sport and the fans that watch, modern sports has
proven vulnerable to corruption on every level.
The universe of sports corruption may be broken into two general
categories: competitive and organizational. 31 Competitive corruption
is any corruption that aims to affect the outcome of a sports competi-
tion. 32 This could be match-fixing or point shaving, or it could involve
performance enhancing drugs (PEDs). Examples of competitive cor-
ruption include paying an athlete to lose a match or to limit the points
scored against an opponent during a match. Organizational corruption
has to do with the organizational structure of sports and sporting
events themselves.33 Unlike competitive corruption, organizational
corruption is not concerned directly with the competitive outcome of
the sporting event.34 Examples of organizational corruption include
scandals in which bribes are made to determine the host city of a
sports event, or to facilitate a sale of a sports franchise.
Recently, there have been a number of sports corruption scandals
that provide examples of both the competitive and organizational cor-
ruption categories. Below is a brief discussion of more recent sports
corruption scandals. The first, a scandal involving soccer match-fixing,
is a clear example of competitive corruption. The second, involving
bribes made related to the sale of Formula One Racing (F1), is a form
of organizational corruption. The third, involving PEDs, straddles the
line between them.
According to a FIFA investigative report, as well as a report by
European policing organization Europol, a criminal syndicate from
Singapore may have fixed almost 700 soccer matches between 2008
and 2011.35 According to the allegations, the Singapore syndicate used
a front organization called Football 4U International to pay referees
hundreds of thousands of dollars to influence the outcomes of
31. See Wolfgang Maennig, Corruption in International Sports and Sport Management:
Forms, Tendencies, Extent, and Countermeasures, 5 EUR. Si'ORr MGMTr. Q. 187, 189 (2005) (re-
ferring to "organizational corruption" as "management corruption").
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Declan Hill & Jer6 Longman, A Shadow Over the World Cup: Fixers Targeted Games
Before 2010 Tournament, Inquiry Finds, N.Y. TIMiES, June 1, 2014, at Al.
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matches, in part to allow insiders to increase gambling winnings.36 The
scandal allegedly spanned the world of organized soccer and even in-
cluded World Cup qualifying games.3 7 According to Interpol, the in-
ternational policing agency, illegal soccer betting operations are
closely linked to other forms of crime, such as human trafficking and
money laundering.38 If these claims are true, they show a worldwide
impact that sports corruption can have, as well as the ripple effect that
it can spread to other forms of organized crime.
Similarly, F1 Racing has seen numerous scandals spanning de-
cades, ranging from illegal surveillance to race fixing. Recently, how-
ever, controversy has surrounded the sport amid allegations that
approximately $45 million (f27 million) in bribes was given to Ger-
man banker Gerhard Gribkowsky in order to facilitate the 2005 sale
of the sport to a buyer chosen by Fl's CEO, Bernie Ecclestone. 39 Ec-
clestone's payments to Gribkowsky were allegedly made to ensure
that the sale of German-based bank BayernLB's 47% stake in F1 rac-
ing would be made to an entity that would retain Ecclestone as F1
CEO.4° While London's High Court acknowledged that Ecclestone's
arrangement with Gribkowsky was corrupt in a civil suit brought by
former F1 shareholder and German media group, Constantin Medien,
the Court dismissed the case because it failed to find any harm to
Constantin Medien as a result of the corruption. 41 In a related crimi-
nal case brought against Ecclestone in Munich, he was allowed to
avoid criminal conviction by paying a settlement of over $100
million.42
Another important contemporary form of corruption concerns
the use of performance enhancing drugs (PEDs). This issue straddles
the line between competitive and organizational corruption, as an in-
dividual taking PEDs to gain an advantage over an opponent relates
directly to the outcome of a sporting competition and therefore com-
36. Id. at 6.
37. Id.
38. Media Release, INTERPOL, Stamping out Football Corruption Through Education Fo-
cus of INTERPOL Experts Meeting in Singapore (Nov. 28, 2012), http://www.interpol.int/News-
and-media/News/2012/PR097.
39. Bernie Ecclestone: Irony Alert, ECONOMIS-r, Aug. 9, 2014, at 54.
40. Fl Boss Bernie Ecclestone Pays to End Bribery Trial, BBC (Aug. 5, 2014, 8:56 PM),
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28656050.
41. Samuel Petrenquin, Ecclestone Wins FI Sale Case, but Judge Calls Deal Corrupt, Asso-
CIATED PRESS (Feb. 20, 2014, 6:50 AM), http://www.ctv.news.ca/sports/ecclestone-wins-fl-sale-
case-but-judge-calls-deal-corrupt-1.1695214.
42. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Lance Armstrong, 7 (U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Oct. 10,
2012), http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/ReasonedDecision.pdf.
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petitive corruption, while the systemic disregard of banned PED use,
or the failure to enforce substantive penalties on those who use them
by a governing sports body to gain viewership or attendance, could be
considered a form of organizational corruption.
The use of PEDs has been especially pronounced in cycling. In
2010, former Tour de France champion Floyd Landis, long under sus-
picion of doping, admitted to using the PED known as EPO, and in
his admission, accused numerous other world-class cyclists of doing
the same. Later, in a 2013 interview with Oprah Winfrey, Lance Arm-
strong admitted in detail the types of PEDs he took-ranging from
EPO to corticosteroids and testosterone.43 According to the U.S.
Anti-Doping Agency, thirty-six of the forty-five medalists in the Tour
de France between 1996 and 2010 have been "similarly tainted by
doping."44
III. THE FIFA WORLD CuP COMES TO BRAZIL
In the context of this perfect storm-a dynamic anti-corruption
reform movement in Brazil, and a rising tide of anti-corruption discus-
sion in sport generally-the FIFA World Cup arrived. Section A de-
scribes the broader issue of corruption in FIFA, and Section B
describes the particular corruption concerns that arose in Brazil's
hosting of FIFA's signature event.
A. Corruption in FIFA
The F6d6ration Internationale de Football Association (FIFA),
soccer's international governing body, has long been mired in corrup-
tion scandals. The recent controversy surrounding the 2022 World
Cup in Qatar has once again focused the world's attention on the or-
ganization. The circumstances of awarding Qatar the right to host the
world's foremost single-sport tournament and the country's subse-
quent treatment of migrant workers have cast a dark shadow on
FIFA's already dubious reputation. The international community,
spearheaded by American and British journalists, has reacted to the
alleged corruption surrounding Qatar by calling for both reform and
abandonment of FIFA as football's governing body. FIFA has re-
sponded to the corruption allegations with tepid internal investiga-
tions and a weak stance against the atrocities occurring in Qatar,
43. Oprah and Lance Armstrong: The Worldwide Exclusive (OWN television broadcast Jan.
17-18, 2013).
44. U.S. Anti-Doping Agency v. Lance Armstrong, 7 (U.S. Anti-Doping Agency, Oct. 10,
2012), http://d3epuodzu3wuis.cloudfront.net/ReasonedDecision.pdf.
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further fueling the growing sentiment that the organization is no
longer able to function properly.
When the small Persian Gulf nation of Qatar was awarded the
2022 World Cup over larger countries such as Japan, Australia, and
notably the United States, suspicion of corruption immediately
erupted. Just a day after the vote was announced, the British media
began reporting that members of the English Football Association,
the nation's governing body for the sport, were questioning FIFA and
its unchecked power.45 The issue did not disappear with time but
rather continued to occasionally surface for nearly four years. Before
the most recent World Cup in Brazil, the corruption scandal again
came to the forefront. Details began to emerge showing just how high
the corruption within FIFA went. A Qatari corporation, owned by a
former Qatari football official, paid former Vice-President Jack
Warner and his family just under two million U.S. dollars in the days
after the awarding of the World Cup.46 The British media then re-
ported that a total of £3 million (roughly $5 million) was paid to other
FIFA officials in the months prior and subsequent to the awarding of
the bid.47
The allegations of massive and high reaching corruption shook
the international soccer community, but FIFA remains largely un-
changed. The organization commissioned an internal investigation
lead by an independent investigator, Michael J. Garcia, formerly the
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York.48
However, this investigation is largely considered to be nothing more
than a faqade.4 9 FIFA's president Sepp Blatter has stated that the so-
called "Garcia Report" will not be made public, a decision he has
made over the protests of FIFA Executive Committee Member Sunil
Gulati (United States), Committee Vice President Prince Ali bin al-
Hussein (Jordan), Committee Vice President Jeffery Webb (Cayman
45. See England 2018 Boss Andy Anson Calls for FIFA Reform, BBC (Dec. 10, 2010, 9:06
AM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport2/hi/football/9253733.stm.
46. Claire Newell, Qatar World Cup 2022 Investigation: Former FIFA Vice-President Jack
Warner and Family Paid Millions, TELEGRAPH (Mar. 17, 2014, 10:00 PM) (U.K.), http://www
.telegraph.co.uk/sport/footba I/world-cup/10704290/Qatar-World-Cup-2022investigation-for
mer-Fifa-vice-president-Jack-Warner-and-family-paid-millions.html.
47. David Bond, Qatar World Cup: '13m Payments to Officials' Corruption Claim, BBC
(May 31, 2014), www.bbc.com/sport/0/football/27652181.
48. Fifa Appoints Michael J Garcia to Investigate Football Corruption, GUARDIAN (July 17,
2012, 1:04 PM) (U.K.), http://www.theguardian.com/football/2012/jul/17/fifa-michael-j-garcia-
football-corrupion.
49. Simon Jenkins, Cleanse Fifa of Corruption by Leaving It, Not Playing Along, GUARDIAN
(June 3, 2014, 2:06 PM) (U.K.), http:l/www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/jun/03/fifa-
sepp-blatter-britain-football.
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Islands), and Garcia himself." Despite growing pressure both inter-
nally and externally, along with a steadily declining approval rating,
FIFA and Blatter have remained fervent that their efforts to combat
corruption are not in any need of reform.51
The term "corruption" has also been used in the popular press in
relation to the humanitarian problems related to Qatar's World Cup
preparation. The exploitation of migrant workers in Qatar, especially
those building the sites for the 2022 World Cup, has left an enormous
stain on FIFA's already soiled reputation. Jeremy Shaap and ESPN
most notably reported on the human rights issues.52 After the sports
network broke the story, traditional news media outlets also began to
investigate. Conservative estimates released by the Qatari govern-
ment place the number of dead migrant workers-mostly Indian and
Nepalese-at 882 for the years 2012 and 2013."3 Reports out of the
country have included allegations of workers not being paid, forced
labor, confiscation of passports, denial of clean, free drinking water in
the harsh arid climate, and death of workers. 54 These reports also indi-
cate that in the summer of 2013, one Nepalese worker died every
day.55 Experts estimate that by the end of the project's completion,
some 4,000 migrant workers will die-an already admittedly conserva-
tive number.56 On its own this is a tragic news story; coupled with
FIFA's insistence that Qatar will remain the host nation for the World
Cup, this issue has become international controversy. For many com-
mentators, FIFA's inaction amounts to the condoning of the Qatari
government's abuse of human rights-a scandal far worse than brib-
ery or financial fraud.
The level of FIFA's disinterest in these crimes and the organiza-
tion's apparent overzealous interest in money has lead commentators
in both the United States and the United Kingdom to call for a break
from soccer's highest organization.57 While the movement has yet to
50. Andrew Das, FIFA's Sepp Blatter Says Corruption Report Will Remain Secret, N.Y.
TIMi.S (Sept. 26, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/27/sports/soccer/fifas-sepp-blatter-says-
corruption-report-will-remain-secret.html r=0.
51. See id.
52. E:60 Qatar's World Cup (ESPN television broadcast June 1, 2014).
53. Pete Pattisson, Qatar Should Not Hold World Cup, Say Relatives of Missing Human
Rights Workers, GUARIDIAN (Sept. 5, 2014, 12:44 PM) (U.K.), http://www.thegaurdian.com/world/
2014/ sep/05/qatar-world-cup-yuvraj-ghimire-questions-human-rights-krishna-upadhyaya.
54. Pete Pattisson, Revealed: Qatar's World Cup 'Slaves', GUARDIAN (Sept. 25, 2013, 12:46
PM) (U.K.), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/sep/25/revealed-qatars-world-cup-slaves.
55. Id.
56. Tin, INr 'i. TRADE CONFI'EI3RAI'ION UNION, ITUC SPECIAL Rizl'owr: TmI, CASE
AGAINST QATAR 15 (2014).
57. Dave Zirin, Op-Ed., Throw FIFA out of the Game, N.Y. TIMIiS, June 8, 2014, at SR5.
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truly gain momentum, continued abuse by FIFA and the countries it
supports will likely continue to drive lovers of the game to options
outside of the association. The U.S. Soccer Federation recently fired a
warning shot to FIFA when it stated that it would refuse to bid for
future World Cups until reform is enacted.58 The status quo of institu-
tionalized corruption and inaction against abuse have created a small
but very real threat to FIFA's unchecked power over the sport of
soccer.
B. Brazil's Hosting of the World Cup
To begin to understand the 2014 World Cup in Brazil, it is imper-
ative to first understand the long, rich history Brazil has with both the
World Cup and soccer. At the same time Brazil became an indepen-
dent republic in the latter half of the 19th century, soccer was intro-
duced into the Brazilian culture-likely coinciding with Brazilians'
love of the game.59 Over time, Brazil proved to be a powerhouse in
international play, creating a strong sense of national pride by winning
a record five World Cups (1958, 1962, 1970, 1994, and 2002).61 In ex-
plaining the role of soccer in Brazilian culture, former President da
Silva said: "Soccer is more than a sport for us, it's a national pas-
sion.,,61 Brazil's national pride in soccer impacts the economic sector
in both tangible and more abstract ways. On a microscale, banks close
and the country essentially stops working during games. 62 On a
macroscale, poor national investment in infrastructure necessary to
support the 2014 World Cup is forecast to have long-term financial
repercussions. Unchecked passions and the interplay between Brazil's
soccer prowess and backing the Brazilian public at large lead to, at
times, rash economic decisions, perhaps including the decision to host
the 2014 World Cup itself.
Brazil beat out Colombia to host the 2014 World Cup on October
30, 2007.63 At the time of the host country selection, Brazilian markets
58. Jenkins, supra note 49.
59. John Cates, Making the Game Beautiful Again: Lessons from Brazil Provide a Roadmap
for Rebuilding Soccer in Nigeria, 39 GA. J. INr'L & COMI. L. 366, 368 (2010).
60. Gabriel do Valle Rocha e Silva, 2014 FIFA World Cup and 2016 Olympics in Brazil-A
Real Blessing for the Brazilian People?, 1-2 1NT'L Srowrs L. J. 89 (2012).
61. Brazil Will Stage 2014 World Cup, BBC (Oct. 30, 2007 2:38 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
sport2/hi/football/internationals7068848.stm.
62. David Biller, Brazil Allows Banks to Cut Opening Hours During Soccer World Cup,
BLOOMBERG (Apr. 9, 2014, 9:36 AM), http:/lwww.bloomberg.com/news/2014-04-09/brazil-al-
lows-banks-to-cut-opening-hours-during-soccer-world-cup.html.
63. Brazil Confirmed as 2014 Hosts, FIFA (Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.fifa.com/worldcup/
newsly=2007/m=1 0/news=brazil-confirmed-2014-hosts-625695.html.
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were strong, rising from 3.2% in 2005 to 4.0% in 2006 and 6.1% in
2007.64 A large share of this growth was due to increased personal
consumption and substantial foreign investment. 6 Unfortunately, that
growth was unsustainable once the world entered an economic down-
turn66 and Brazil's economic growth stagnated in 2010 67-well before
the 2014 World Cup and the 25.8 billion reais ($11.3 billion) expendi-
ture required to host the event.68 Popular commentators and scholars
have additionally blamed Brazil's economic snap-downturn on corrup-
tion within the country for curbing what was once a formidable for-
eign investment. From 2008 to 2013, the peak years of the global
recession, Brazil only improved from 80th place to 72nd on Trans-
parency International's Corruption Perceptions Index.69 At the time
of the 2014 World Cup, Goldman Sachs concluded in an internal re-
port that "Brazil is trying to extricate itself from a four-year-long equi-
librium of low growth, high inflation, high and internationally
uncompetitive unit labor costs, and an overvalued currency (the
BRL)."70 The unforeseen economic collapse of the global economy-
in addition to the demand of substantial sports investment-was a ma-
jor blow to Brazil's economy and might continue to negatively impact
the country's citizens even after the end of the 2014 World Cup and
2016 Olympic Games.
In deciding to host the 2014 World Cup, Brazil and the country's
politicians seemingly conceded to the citizens' desires, notwithstand-
ing evidence that taking on such a project is economically detrimental
to a country's long-term growth. Economic scholarship holds that such
a "mega-project" is difficult to justify in the long term. Prevalent small
transactional skimming and corruption also makes calculating finer
64. Daniel Altman, Get Real: Brazil's Economic Party Ended Well Before the World Cup
Was Set to Begin. What Went Wrong?, FP (Feb. 25, 2014), http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articies/
2014/02/25/get-realwhat happened to brazilseconomy?wp login-redirect=0.
65. Phillip Rauber, The Americas: Private Consumption Drives Brazil's Growth, CRI'Drr
SuIssE (May 17, 2010) (Switz.), https://www.credit-suisse.com/us/en/news-and-expertise/news/
economy/the-americas.article.htm/article/pwp/news-and-expertise/2010/05/en/private-consump
tion-drives-brazils-growth.html.
66. See generally INT'I MONTIARY FUND, WOI -I) ECONOMIC OUTC)OOK: CIRISIS AN!) RE-
COVLRY (2009).
67. Id. at 90.
68. Anthony Boadle, World Cup Leaves Brazil Costly Stadiums, Poor Public Transport,
Rru'TIRs (Sept. 10, 2014) (U.K.), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/05/uk-brazil-worldcup-in
frastructure-idUKKBNOEG24F20140605.
69. Altman, supra note 64.
70. GOLIDMAN SACIs, Ti WORLD CUP AND ECONOMICS 2014, at 21 (2014).
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expenditures almost impossible.7' This problem is not unusual, as one
commentator has remarked, "It is not the best projects that get cho-
sen, but those that look best on paper. And the projects that look best
on paper are those with the largest cost underestimates and benefit
overestimates. '7 2 Adding to a potentially stressful economic situation,
allegations of corruption are often most rampant in developing na-
tions or countries that must take on large scale projects necessary to
hosting.
While hosting the World Cup may be economically feasible for
countries with existing infrastructure, developing countries or coun-
tries without existing infrastructure often take on a substantial risk in
hosting the games.73 When Germany hosted the World Cup in 2006, it
spent an estimated C3.7 billion on infrastructure related to the com-
petition and also saw 15 million more visitors than expected.7 ' The
2006 World Cup earned Germany C300 million ($399 million) in reve-
nue, added C2 billion to retail sales, and yielded 50,000 new jobs.75
Additionally, C40 million from ticket sales went to the German trea-
sury.76 To bolster the point, during the 1994 World Cup, the United
States spent less than $30 million on infrastructure improvements. 77 If
Brazil had existing infrastructure to cater to such an event-like Ger-
many or the U.S. did-at the time of winning its bid for hosting the
2014 World Cup, it could have avoided the social unrest and allega-
tions of corruption that accompanied the games by saving public
money used on infrastructure.
While protests regarding the competition and allegations of cor-
ruption have been prevalent in Brazil for the better part of two years
in preparation for the World Cup, those narrower protests are now
bleeding into the large-scale protests of government corruption and
irresponsible economic policy.78 According to USA Today, the pro-
tests leading up to the 2014 World Cup "have become the largest pub-
71. See generally Bent Flyvbjerg, Mega Delusional: The Curse of the Megaproject, Nljw Sci-
I-NTIST, Nov. 30, 2013, at 28, 28.
72. Id.
73. Victor A. Matheson & Robert A. Baade, Mega Sporting Events in Developing Nations:
Playing the Way to Prosperity?, 72 S. Ai-i. J. ECON. 1085, 1087 (2004).
74. DW Staff, Germany's World Cup Report Hails Economic, Social Success, DLurscII-
WELLE (Dec. 7, 2006), http://www.dw.de/germanys-world-cup-reporthails-economic-social-suc
cess/a-2263053.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Matheson & Baade, supra note 73, at 1091.
78. Brazil Anti-World Cup Protests Hit Sao Paulo and Rio, BBC (May 15, 2014), http://www
.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-27423404.
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lic demonstrations Latin America's biggest nation has seen in two
decades."79 Allegations of corruption plagued the event since the out-
set of the projects. A majority of the accusations were based on cor-
ruption and bribery related to construction for the event, primarily the
FIFA-mandated World Cup stadiums. The key construction consor-
tium accused of corruption was Andrade Gutierrez.80 Costs soared
over estimates:
the latest estimate for 12 new and refurbished stadiums show[ed]
costs of about 8 billion reais ($3.6 billion), 2.7 billion reais more
than the first detailed estimate issued in 2010 and almost four times
the amount Brazil told soccer's governing body stadiums would cost
in its 2007 hosting file.81
In the years leading up to the World Cup, support for the tournament
plummeted from 79% in 2007 to 48% in the month before the
competition.82
IV. OLYMPIC CORRUPTION
Though corruption allegations are nearly as old as the Olympic
Games themselves, the narrative has quite recently reached a fever
pitch. This section first describes the history of corruption allegations
related to the Olympics, and then details the extraordinary allegations
related to the Sochi Games.
A. A History of Olympic Corruption
The first known instance of Olympic corruption occurred as early
as 396 B.C., when officials were fined for "dishonest judgment. 83
Others place the advent of corruption in the Olympics eight years
later, in 388 B.C., when Eupolos of Thessalia bribed three of his com-
petitors.84 Within Olympic and historic literature, competitive corrup-
79. Bradley Brooks, Brazil: 250K Protest Against Government Corruption, USA TODAY
(June 23, 2013, 1:50 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/06/22/brazil-thous
ands-protest-anew-but-crowds-smaller/2449229.
80. Brazil Audit. 'Corrupt World Cup Costs', A JAZEIZRA, http://www.aljazeera.com/news/
americas/2014/05/brazil-audit-shows-corrupt-world-cup-costs-201451263240585772.htmI (last up-
dated May 13, 2014); Bradley Brooks, Brazil Built the World's Second-Most Expensive Soccer
Stadium in a City with No Pro Team, BUSINIESS INSIDER (May 12, 2014 5:41 AM), http://www.
businessinsider.com/brazils-world-cup-problems-with-corruption-2014-5.
81. Tariq Panja, Corruption to Blame for Some Brazil World Cup Cost Rises, Bi-oOMiFRG
BUSINESSWIEI K (May 23, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-05-22/corruption-to-
blame-for-some-brazil-world-cup-cost-rises.
82. Protest in Brazil: Cheering for Argentina, ECONOMIST, May 31, 2014, at 29.
83. Maennig, supra note 31, at 187.
84. Id.
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tion amongst athletes, referees, and judges is by far the most
discussed. Organizational corruption, by contrast, is a relatively new
phenomenon.
The first time the potential benefits of hosting Olympic Games
and its potentially corruptive force were brought to the public's atten-
tion was the Salt Lake City bribery scandal during the winter of 1998-
1999.85 This news storm erupted when the media got wind that the
Salt Lake City bid committee took measures to secure the votes of
International Olympic Committee (IOC) members for Salt Lake
City's hosting of the 2002 Winter Games. These measures consisted
largely of bribes paid to IOC members, and substantial "gifts" given
to IOC family members, including cash, college scholarships, and
travel expenses.86 An inquiry into the corruption allegations revealed
that two top officials leading Salt Lake City's bid paid more than $1
million to twenty-four IOC members.87 A number of IOC and Salt
Lake Organizing Committee members stepped down in the scandal's
wake.
During this time period, claims of abuse in host-city voting for the
2000 Sydney Games, 1998 Nagano Games, and 1996 Atlanta Games
also began to surface.88 Indeed, such allegations have arisen many
times in the history of modern Olympics, but until Salt Lake City, they
had rarely been proven.89 A top Sydney organizer later admitted to
giving $70,000 to two African nations the night before Sydney won the
Olympic bid.90 The money was intended to bolster sports programs in
Kenya and Uganda, but the Sydney organizer also stated that he"pledged the money because he felt Sydney's chances were 'slipping
away."' 9 Sydney beat Beijing for the 2000 Olympics by only two
votes.92 An independent investigation into Sydney's bid revealed that
Sydney officials broke IOC rules, but noted their actions "fell short of
corruption." 93 A well-known Japanese newspaper claimed to have evi-
85. Mallon, supra note 2.
86. Id.
87. Olympics Must Ban 'Gift-Giving', BBC (Mar. 1, 1999, 8:25 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/sport/288650.stm.
88. Mallon, supra note 2, at 13-14.
89. Olympic 'Vote Buying' Scandal, BBC (Dec. 12, 1998, 5:25 PM), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/
hi/europe/233742.stm.
90. Alan Abrahamson, Australian Paid IOC Members in Sydney Bid, L.A. TIM]-.S, Jan. 23,
1999, at Al.
91. Id. at A20.
92. Id. at Al, A20.
93. PAUL CLOSE ET AL., Tin- BEIJING OLYMPIAI: Tin:i POLrrICAL ECONOMY OF A SPORT-
ING MEGA-EVENT 89 (2007).
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dence that Nagano's bid committee spent more than $6 million enter-
taining IOC officials during its bid to host the 1998 Winter Games.94
However, investigators were unable to delve into the accusations fur-
ther once it was discovered that Nagano officials had destroyed all bid
committee records.95 Toronto's bid committee for the 1996 Summer
Games released a report detailing how some IOC members cashed in
first-class airline tickets that were provided by Toronto organizers and
demanded special favors and gifts that could be turned into cash. 96 A
report confirmed that Atlanta officials also provided travel and expen-
sive gifts to IOC members.97
An independent IOC commission called for an overhaul of the
host city bidding process, most notably for an end to the "culture of
improper gift giving" that encourages vote-buying.98 After investigat-
ing the Salt Lake City bid, the United States Olympic Committee re-
leased a report proposing that the IOC implement term limits and
periodic elections, submit to independent audits, publish financial
records, and create a central fund to provide for travel expenses.99
While the IOC needed to clean house, Salt Lake City officials were
also to blame. Trying to restore the city's reputation, Salt Lake or-
ganizers appointed a new chief executive, made organizing committee
meetings and financial records accessible to the public, included ath-
letes and other community representatives on the organizing commit-
tee, and embraced a stricter ethics policy.'00
Oddly enough, however, the scope of the inquiry into bribery in
the bid process was limited to the IOC and host-city bid committees.
It does not appear that many people asked whether businesses would
be similarly motivated to engage in bribery to win contracts if a city
engaged in bribery to win the Games. That is-the bidding scandal
has focused on IOC reforms, but not the reforms needed in host cities
or their national governments.
Hosting the Olympic Games is a huge economic and infrastruc-
tural undertaking, providing ample opportunity for corruption to
94. See Olympics Official Admits 'Mistakes' but Denies Illegal Actions, CNN (Feb. 3, 1999,
5:33 AM), http://www.cnn.com/US/9902/03/olympics.01/index.html.
95. Mallon, supra note 2, at 12.
96. Roberto Suro, Air Travel Allegedly Hid Payoffs: U.S. Says IOC Members Traded Tick-
ets for Cash, WASh. Posr, Feb. 5, 1999, at Al, A26.
97. Irvin Molotsky, Corruption Allegations Investigated, N.Y. TIMIS, Oct. 15, 1999, at D5.
98. See Richard Sandomir, Inquiry Cites Olympic 'Culture' of Impropriety, N.Y. TIMIS,
Mar. 2, 1999, at A], D1-D2.
99. Id. at D2.
100. Scandal-Hit Olympic City Sweeps Clean, BBC (Feb. 11, 1999, 10:53 PM), http://news.bbc
.co.uk12lhi/sport1278035.stm.
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"seep into" areas such as the procurement of contracts, funds, and
corporate sponsorships.' 0 Depending on a country's existing level of
bureaucratic transparency and anti-corruption and anti-bribery law,
the areas for potential corruption may be a bigger concern for some
Olympic hosts than for others. For example, in 2011 in Greece, a
country hardly known for its efficient and transparent bureaucracy,
the German electronics company, Siemens, was found to have bribed
Greek government officials to obtain telecom and security contracts
for the 2004 Athens Olympics.102 Once it won the contracts, Siemens
used some of them to install "dummy project[s]" and "to incur over-
payments . . . instead of providing a feasible and effective Olympic
security system."' 3 To the contrary in London, bribery is not an ac-
cepted method of conducting business, and "the London Olympic or-
ganizing committee [was] commended for their transparency and
openness in awarding contracts for these infrastructure projects" lead-
ing up to the 2012 Games.10 4 Accordingly, the risk for corrupt prac-
tices and misallocation of funds not only increases with the size of the
project (and in terms of the Olympic Games, the size of the project is
literally and figuratively Olympian), but also increases with the under-
lying levels of corruption and acceptance of corrupt practices in the
host state.
Relatedly, a host city's infrastructure and housing efforts will also
give rise to popular allegations of corruption. The Olympic Games
substantially impacted the housing rights of citizens in numerous host
cities. According to the Centre on Housing Rights & Evictions, prepa-
rations for the Olympics "have displaced more than two million peo-
ple-mostly the poor, homeless, as well as minority groups."' 0 5 In
preparation for the 1988 Seoul Games, the Seoul city government was
opposed to bidding for the games largely because the organizing com-
mittee would likely exploit the "substandard" housing around the
city. 0 6 Once Seoul won the bid, the organizing committee hired pri-
101. Claire Springer, A Corruption-Free Olympics?, P'SHIP rFOR TRANSPARENCY FUND (Aug.
6, 2012), http://ptfund.org/2012/08/olympics-corruption.
102. Minas Samatas, The SAIC-Siemens 'Super-Panopticon' in the Athens 2004 Olympics as a
Case of 'McVeillance': The Surveillance-Industrial Complex's Unscrupulous Global Business, in
TiIE SURVEI LLANCE-INDUSTRIAl. COMPLEX: A Po. ECON. OF SURVEILLANCr; 61, 69 (Kirstie
Ball & Laureen Snider eds., 2013).
103. Id.
104. Springer, supra note 101.
105. Mega Events, CTIR. ON HOUS. RIGHTS & EVICTIONS, http://www.cohre.org/topics/mega-
events (last visited Oct. 25, 2014); see CTR. ON HoUs. RicirTs & EvIcrIONS, FAIR PLAY --OR
HOUSING RIGHTS: MEGA-EVENTS, Olympic Games and Housing Rights 9, 11 (2007).
106. FAIR PLAY FOR HOUSING RIGITS, supra note 105, at 83.
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vate construction companies to carry out its urban redevelopment
plan. Those companies would often resort to the extralegal hiring of
private eviction companies that employed "'thugs' to get rid of ex-
isting residents."' 7 An estimated 720,000 people were forcibly
evicted.' °8 Similarly, in preparation for the 2008 Beijing Games, 1.5
million people were displaced to create space for Olympic venues and
other urban facilities and infrastructure.0 9 Though it is unclear how
many were forcibly evicted, evidence indicates that many residents
were coerced into leaving their homes in exchange for compensation
below fair market value."' 0 Other concerns arose in the 1992 Barce-
lona Games when housing in the city became so unaffordable that it
forced many low-income earners to leave the city. Prior to the 2004
Athens Games, Roma residents were displaced under the guise of
Olympic preparation. 1 ' A common theme in many of these scenarios
is that host cities did not seek any citizen participation throughout the
urban transformation process."12 Brazil has already engaged in slum-
clearing in anticipation of the World Cup, and this may continue as
preparation for the Olympic Games ramps up. 1' 3
Alleged human rights abuses took a different form when the
Olympic Games intersected with the political system of modern
China. When Beijing won the bid for the 2008 Summer Games, Chi-
nese officials specifically stated that there would be no restrictions on
journalists covering the Olympics." 4 However, during the games,
journalists experienced a wide range of restrictions. Foreign reporters
cited incidents of restricted internet access, restricted movement, and
Chinese police taking photographs of them as they interviewed ath-
letes.'15 Chinese officials also released a directive to Chinese reporters
107. Id. at 86.
108. Id. at 11.
109. CTR. ON Hous. RiGirrs & EvlcrHoNs, ONE WORLD, WiiosIE DlI£AM?: HOUSING
Riirrs VIOLATIONS AND TniE Bj IJING OLYMPIC GAMIs 6-7 (Robert Furlong ed., 2008).
110. FAIR PLAY FOR HOUSING RiGirrs, supra note 105, at 95; ONE WOIuLD, WIIOSE
DREAM?, supra note 109, at 8, 26.
111. FAIR PLAY FOR HOUSING RIGH-TS, supra note 105, at 11.
112. Id. at 36.
113. See Lauren Marie Schweizer, Brazil Faces Backlash in Its Slum Eviction Process to
Make Way for Mega-Events, L. & GLOBAL JUST. F. (May 8, 2012), http://www.lgjf.org/2012/05/
brazil-faces-backlash-in-its-slum-eviction-process-to-make-way-for-mega-events (citing Erika
O'Conor & Taylor Barnes, Slum Dwellers are Defying Brazil's Grand Design for Olympics, N.Y.
TIMEs, Mar. 5, 2012, at Al).
114. Mark Magnier, China Extends Looser Rules for Media, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 18, 2008, at
A3.
115. See Mitchell Landsberg, Beijing is Accused of Unfair Play, L.A. TIMIS,. Aug 7. 2007, at
A], A5; Dave Zirin, No Free Press at Beijing Olympics, NATION (Aug. 15, 2008,9:01 AM), http://
www.thenation.comlblog/no-free-press-beijing-olympics.
2014]
90 SOUTHWESTERN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
that listed taboo subjects that journalists could not cover and confis-
cated the notebooks and tape recorders of Chinese journalists who
were interviewing athletes after American Todd Bachman was
stabbed to death.'1 6 China also sought to censor reporting of the Tibet
and Olympic protests by extending communication restrictions.'17 The
Chinese Public Security bureau ordered foreign-owned Chinese hotels
to install spy equipment on Internet connections, threatening severe
retaliation if they did not comply."18
Finally, ticket sales during the Games can also give rise to corrup-
tion allegations. In the lead up to the 2012 London Games, it was
discovered that a number of national Olympic committees were in-
volved in a scheme to sell thousands of premium tickets on the black
market.1 9 The tickets were intended for sale in the committees' home
countries at face value, but the offending members sold them abroad
for up to ten times the market value.'2 0 News reports claimed that
twenty-seven representatives of fifty-four countries participated. 21
B. Lessons from Sochi
Russia spent more money on the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi
than any previous host of the games-a price tag of more than $50
billion. 22 Yet, Russia's zealous spending has only served to weaken
the country's chance to foster new global economic relationships. Po-
litical abuse, cronyism, irresponsibility, and most importantly-au-
thoritarian corruption-have prevented Sochi from lavishing in the
marvel of its price tag.' 23 Future hosts to Olympic games, or any other
mega-event for that matter, should take lessons from Sochi and in-
stead exploit the tremendous economic prosperity such an event can
provide.
116. Zirin, supra note 115.
117. Yuezhi Zhao, Beware the Hidden Agendas of Media Censorship in China, ASIA PAC.
FoUND. CAN. (June 10, 2008), http://www.asiapacific.ca/sites/defaultlfiles/filefield/bulletin295.
pdf.
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Senator Says, L.A. TIMi-S, July 30, 2008, at A7.
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120. Id.
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Disputes arise over the final estimated costs of the Games in
Sochi. 124 Some argue that the commonly cited $50 billion expense of
Sochi is perhaps exaggerated and that citing such a figure fails to take
inflation into consideration.2 5 However, it is unnecessary to agree
upon an accurate total figure to grasp the level of omnipresent corrup-
tion involved. Instead, one need only look at who paid for the games
and who profited from inexplicably high construction costs, all with-
out facing prosecution for corrupt business practices.
Corruption associated with construction in Sochi can generally be
placed into three categories: (i) fictitious employment, where corpora-
tions received extra funds from the state for employees that did not
exist; (ii) kickbacks to government officials by corporate employees
after a corporation was awarded a contract; and (iii) overbilling for
supplies. This article provides examples of construction projects for
the Games in Sochi where evidence suggests that gross illicit expendi-
tures occurred in each of these categories.
Unlike most democratic Western countries, the Russian federal
government paid almost the entire cost of the Games in Sochi (more
than 90%).126 This includes operating expenses for the seventeen days
of the games and infrastructure development. 127 Additionally, Russia
did not utilize a private Organizing Committee for the Olympic
Games (OCOG), which is normally formed to manage host country
infrastructure development and is typically accountable to the IOC.' 8
Instead, Olimpstroy, a state-run corporation, managed construction in
Sochi. 129 Thus, President Putin's regime controlled almost every ex-
penditure, and through Olimpstroy, selected all construction
profiteers.
One of the benefits to utilizing an OCOG is the transparency of
the contract-awarding process. This transparency encourages eco-
nomic competition via contract bids. However, Olimpstroy had special
status as a state-owned corporation that affords certain legal protec-
tions, making the contract-bidding process secretive and without cor-
124. Orttung & Zhemukhov, supra note 4, at 181.
125. Paul Farhi, Did the Winter Olympics in Sochi Really Cost $50 Billion? A Closer Look at
That Figure, WASIL Pos'r (Feb. 10, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/lifestyle/style/did-the-
winter-oiympics-in-sochi-really-cost-50-billion-a-closer-look-at-that-figu re/201 4/02/10/a29e37b4-
9260-1 1e3-b46a-5a3dOd2l3Oda-story.html.
126. Robert W. Orttung, Olimpstroy: Building the Sochi Olympics from Scratch, Russ. ANA-
'IICAi Dio., Feb. 9, 2014, at 5, 5, available at http://www.css.ethz.ch/publications/pdfs/RAD-1
43.pdf.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 5-6.
129. Id. at 6.
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ruption accountability. 3 ° The Russian construction industry is known
as highly corrupt, so imposing the transparency of an OCOG would
likely have exposed the tremendous illicit business practices in
Russia. '31
Projects run by Olimpstroy were unprecedented in cost. The cost
of building stadiums, roads, and bridges in Sochi far exceeds the cost
of comparable projects in other developed countries in the world. 132
One Russian political economist wrote that the eight key Olympic
sites in Sochi cost 54% more to build compared to similar projects and
that the difference in cost was only explained by the corruption of
insiders controlling construction.1 33
For example, the Fisht Olympic Stadium, which hosted the open-
ing and closing ceremonies, saw a construction budget that tripled
from an initial $260 million to $780 million. 134 Final expenses for this
project are estimated to be three times more expensive than building a
comparable stadium elsewhere. 35 Similarly, the Bolshoi Ice Palace
had an original budget of $200 million. 136 At its completion, the pro-
ject totaled well over $300 million.' 37 The Rosa Khutor Mountain Re-
sort is now the country's largest ski resort.138 Originally with a budget
of $150 million, the project topped off at $2.2 billon. 39 In all, the orig-
inal budget for Sochi that President Putin provided to the IOC in 2007
was $12 billion. 140 At the end of 2011, the Russian government
claimed costs had grown to over $41 billion, and Russian anti-corrup-
tion political activists reported that the budget had increased to over
$50 billion by 2013.'4'
The turnstile leadership of Olimpstroy, an organization charged
with leading Russia in one of the nation's greatest economic feats, is
highly troubling. Four different people were appointed president of
Olimpstroy since its creation in 2008.t42 This high turnover rate sug-
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See id.
134. Sochi-2014: The Reverse Side of the Medal, INST. MODERN Russ., http://sochi2014. im-
russia.org/en/Fisht-Olympic-Stadium (last visited Oct. 6, 2014).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. Id.
140. The Sochi Olympics, supra note 123, at 45.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 46.
[Vol. 21
FROM 2014 WORLD CUP TO 2016 OLYMPICS
gests challenges in the discretion afforded to Olimpstroy to spend
Russian funds. It also indicates a power struggle at the highest ranks
of the Putin regime regarding which construction corporations would
profit from the tremendous budget of Sochi.
Even with the astounding costs of Sochi, prosecutors have not
charged anyone involved with embezzlement or corruption. Law en-
forcement agencies have initiated investigations, but the Putin regime
quieted all proceedings, and not a single person within the Russian
government or the private sector has been convicted of a crime. In
addition to electing not to prosecute anyone on corruption charges,
the investigative process by the Russian government is not transpar-
ent.143 This is a troubled model for the suppression of a prosperous
free market economy, and an example of the quickest way to lose the
trust of the global economy.
Mega-events can have mega-effects on a host country's reputa-
tion. With respect to the Sochi Olympic Games, the main justification
for countries making bids was to "present the city and host country in
the best possible light to investors."' 44 However, reports of high levels
of corruption and lack of transparency were central to the Sochi
Olympics narrative. This reversed what could have been a positive
cultural image of Russia portrayed on a worldwide scale. The results
of these reports and the Sochi narrative together demonstrate how
corruption can negatively impact the foreign direct investment that
mega-event host countries can expect in the future.
With respect to the lessons potential host countries should take
from Sochi, "the important thing here is to reduce not only the real
level of corruption, but also the level of corruption perceived as real
by those involved. ' '1 45 Sochi should be seen as a case study of how a
lack of transparency in the organization of the games, and the official
reaction to corruption reports, resulted in a high-level of perceived
corruption in both Russia and Sochi.
In Sochi and Russia, the legal mechanisms for allocating state
funds to Olympic projects were translucent at best, and cloaked in
secrecy at worst. 146 Olimpstroy, as a state corporation, "[does not]
143. Orttung & Zhemukhov, supra note 4, at 185.
144. Andrew Bender, Sochi's Long Term Economic Impact: Good or Bad?, FORmBS (Feb.
23, 2014, 1:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/andrewbender/2014/02/23/sochis-long-term-eco
nomic-impact-good-or-bad.
145. Maennig, supra note 31, at 214.
146. John Home & Wolfram Manzenreiter, Introduction To SPors MEGA-EVENTS: SOCIAL
SCIIENTIIIC ANALYSES O1 A GLOBAl PiIENOMINON 12 (John Home & Wolfram Manzenreiter
eds., 2006).
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have to report very much to anyone on their activities .... They are
not required to provide annual financial reports and lack transparency
in other respects. '147 This special status allowed Olimpstroy to go
without providing comprehensive annual financial reports. 48 Even
the decision of where to hold the Games was made in secret.1 49
In response to the lack of transparency, civil society stepped in.
Most notably, prominent anti-corruption activist Alexei Navalny ana-
lyzed and explained the illicit financial flows involved in major infra-
structure in the Sochi 2014: Encyclopedia of Spending.150 Interestingly
enough, Navalny was put on house arrest for two months in February
2014, for alleged travel violations-one month after this report was
published. 51 Another illuminative report, a documentary entitled
"Putin's Games" was released despite attempts by the authorities to
suppress it. 152
In the social media world, an influential twitter trend,
"#SochiProblems," attempted to expose projects marred by corrup-
tion, done haphazardly, or not done at all. Pictures surfaced of unsani-
tary water, unfinished roads, and poorly constructed hotels.153
However, reverse image searches found that many photos attributed
to Sochi were obviously Photoshopped as photos from other coun-
tries, or as photos in very different contexts than portrayed on Twit-
ter.154 There is no doubt that this proliferation of negative information
had a serious impact on the way the public perceived both Sochi and
Russia.
Changing the way the public understands corruption issues is one
way to lower the perceived level of corruption in a host country. The
first step to helping the public understand such issues is by encourag-
ing transparency in event initiatives and organization. As far as
opportunities for corruption go, "simple, transparent, and easily un-
147. Anastasia Urnova, Russian State Corporations: A Stabilizing Economic Force or a Drag
on Growth?, WILSON C17MINER, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russian-state-corpora
tions-stabilizing-economic-force-or-drag-growth (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
148. Orttung & Zhemukhov, supra note 4, at 184.
149. Id. at 180.
150. Tiiu ANTI-CORRUPTION FUND, SOCI 2014: ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPENDING-THI CosTr
Or OI.yMPlcs RjrITORT 4 (2014).
151. Andrew Roth, Court Orders House Arrest, and No Internet, for Fierce Critic of Putin,
N.Y. TIME~s, Mar. 1, 2014, at A4.
152. Sofia Kornienko & Claire Bigg, 'Putin's Games' Sheds Light on Corruption, Abuse in
Sochi, RADIO FREE EUR. RADIO LIBERTY (Dec. 6, 2013), http://www.rferl.org/content/russia-
putins-games-sochi/25191988.html.
153. False and Misleading #Sochiproblems, WiIIEN IN SoCHI (Mar. 16, 2014), http:// whenin-
sochi.wordpress.com/2014/03/16/call-it-sochifreude-on-the-proliferation-of-false-sochiproblems.
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derstandable decisions are at a low risk of corruption." '55 Further-
more, when a host country does not feel the need to hide the decisions
made in the hosting process, it is much less likely that misinformation
and criticism will negatively impact their international reputation as a
sound destination for investment.
V. CONCLUSION: REMAINING TOPICS FOR RESEARCH
The Rio Olympics will thus provide a prime opportunity to gauge
the success of a nation's effort to bring credibility-both to its own
government and to the Olympic Games it hosts. This paper's discus-
sion of the forces that first converged on Brazil's hosting of the World
Cup, and will influence the execution of Rio's Summer Olympics,
raises a series of research questions, both empirical and theoretical.
The Brazil World Cup, much like past Olympics, produced nu-
merous allegations of government misconduct: infrastructure con-
struction was delayed, over budget, or incomplete; significant
government financial decisions failed to reflect the public will; disad-
vantaged communities were forcibly removed; the host governments
took a variety of other measures that arguably violated human rights.
But do these constitute corruption? Though the media uses the word
loosely, should they? A common definition of corruption today is "the
abuse of public office for private gain." '156 How much of the above
misconduct can be explained by conduct that fits within that narrow
definition? If less than the public may now assume, then what will be
the lesson to the world? Is our definition of corruption too narrow or
our use of the word too loose? In a time when discussions of corrup-
tion are framed by perceptions-note the oft-cited Corruption Per-
ceptions Index' 57-are our perceptions of Brazilian corruption
exaggerated, or based on careful definitions and accurate facts?
Time will ultimately tell whether the Olympic corruption narra-
tive proves different post-Rio than it is now post-Sochi. On the sur-
face, the two host countries are strikingly similar: both are BRIC
(Brazil, Russia, India and China) nations, both practice forms of state
capitalism in which the government more actively manages commer-
cial affairs, and both are looking to raise their stature in the world.
Will the alleged abuses of Putin's autocratic regime be repeated in
155. Maennig, supra note 31, at 210.
156. E.g., Tiw WORILD BANK, HELiPING COUNTRIns COMBAT CORRUVFION: Tin, Roi.i O1"
TiE WoRLDi9 BANK 8 (1997).
157. See Corruptions Perceptions Index: Overview, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, http://www.trans
parency.org/research/cpi/overview (last visited Nov. 1, 2014).
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Brazil? Or will Brazil's democratic institutions provide the needed
counterforce? Post-World Cup, the popular press has proven surpris-
ingly disinterested in continuing the corruption narrative; very few al-
legations of corruption against specified individuals have been made
in the press, and even fewer have been made in the courts. Is this
because less corruption occurred, or because Brazil's democratic insti-
tutions, independent judiciary, and free press were no more effective
in holding corrupt parties accountable than autocratic Russia's?
Ultimately, will Brazil prove a success story, a vindication of the
Olympics, the BRICs, and of the anti-corruption movement gener-
ally? And if it is, will the media recognize it as such? The inquiry must
occur on two levels: Brazil's actual successes and the media coverage
and global perception of Brazil's success. These can be very different.
This paper, and its sequel, hopes to influence those perceptions.
